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Defining Disputes and Characterizing Claims: Subject-matter jurisdiction 






The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is 
considered to be one of the most important law-making treaties of the 
twentieth century.1  As well as clarifying the key rules and principles that 
define maritime jurisdiction, it is also notable for containing a compulsory 
dispute settlement system in Part XV, which allows most disputes to be 
submitted to binding adjudication or arbitration.2  All states must accept this 
dispute settlement system when they become a party to the Convention and it 
has been described by one author as ‘the cement which holds the whole 
structure together and guarantees its continued acceptability and endurance 
for all parties.’3  
 
Central to the dispute settlement system established in Part XV is 
Article 286, which acts as a compromissory clause.4 This provision is 
important because it provides the consensual basis for dispute settlement.5 It 
is this expression of consent that allows a court or tribunal to deliver a 
binding determination of a dispute.  Yet, the ability to bring a claim under 
UNCLOS is not unconditional and jurisdiction is limited ratione temporis, 
ratione loci, ratione personae, and ratione materiae.6  It is the latter category of 
limits that is addressed in this paper.   
 
Jurisdiction ratione materiae is concerned with the subject-matter of 
the dispute. In this respect, the Convention simply provides that ‘a court or 
tribunal referred to in article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute 
concerning the interpretation and application of this Convention, which is 
submitted to it in accordance with this Part.’7 This simple language hides a 
number of hurdles that must be crossed by a wannabe litigant before it can 
get a decision on the merits of its claims. Indeed, it is common in practice for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Edinburgh School of Law. Contact email: 
james.harrison@ed.ac.uk  
1 See eg Secretary-General's remarks at Law of Sea conference and launch of UN Oceans Compact, 12 August 2012, in 
which he describes the Convention as ‘among the world’s most significant legal instruments’; available at 
<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2012-08-12/secretary-generals-remarks-law-sea-conference-
and-launch-un-oceans> accessed 1 December 2016.  
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Articles 279-299.   
3 AE Boyle, ‘Forum Shopping for UNCLOS Disputes relating to Marine Scientific Research’, in M Nordquist et al 
(eds), Law, Science and Ocean Management (Brill 2007) 523.  
4 This provision must be read in connection with, inter alia, Articles 287 and 288.  See also the paper by Churchill in 
this special edition. 
5 Consent to dispute settlement is an axiomatic principle of the international legal order; see eg Status of Eastern 
Carelia (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Reports Series B, No. 5, 27; East Timor Case (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Reports 90, 
para 26. 
6 See eg G Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Volume IV (Stevens & 
Sons 1986) 432. 
7 UNCLOS, Article 288(1).  In certain circumstances, the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal can be extended by virtue 
of Article 288(2). 
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respondents to resist litigation by arguing that the claims against it not fall 
within the scope of the compromissory clause in UNCLOS.8  
 
This contribution to the special issue will focus on the three main 
arguments relating to jurisdiction ratione materiae that have been raised in 
order to avoid proceedings under the compulsory dispute settlement system 
of Part XV of UNCLOS.9 Firstly, it will address arguments relating to the 
existence of a dispute. Secondly, it will consider arguments as to whether a 
dispute falls within the scope of UNCLOS. Thirdly, it will look at the question 
of whether the claims that pass these two hurdles can nevertheless be 
dismissed because they are predominantly concerned with the interpretation 
and application of other rules of law that fall outside the scope of UNCLOS.  
What all of these issues have in common is that they require courts and 
tribunals to scrutinize the scope and character of the claims that are advanced 
by litigants. In the words of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), these 
issues often require courts and tribunals to ‘isolate the real issue in the case 
and identify the object of the claim.’10 This paper will explore how courts and 
tribunals have carried out this process when policing the limits of UNCLOS 
dispute settlement.  
 
 
2. Determining the existence of a dispute  
 
The first question that arises for any court or tribunal acting under Part XV of 
UNCLOS is whether there is a dispute between the two parties to the 
litigation that can trigger the process of dispute settlement.  The existence of a 
dispute is a pre-condition of Article 286, which derives from the judicial 
character of courts and tribunals and the fact that ‘[their] function … is to 
state the law, but [they] may pronounce judgment only in connection with 
concrete cases where there exists at the time of the adjudication an actual 
controversy involving a conflict of legal interests between the parties.’11 As 
noted by Schreuer, ‘far from being a purely academic issue, the existence vel 
non of a dispute can be decisive to determine a court’s or tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.’12 
 
As a general matter, a dispute has been broadly defined by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice as ‘a disagreement on a point of law 
or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons.’13 This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See RR Churchill, ‘Some Reflections on the Operation of the Dispute Settlement System of the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea During its First Decade’, in D Freestone et al (eds), Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (OUP 2006) 
399. 
9 The paper will not address exceptions to jurisdiction, which are dealt with by other contributions to this special 
issue. See also discussion of the recent case law on this topic in N Klein, ‘Expansions and Restrictions in the UNCLOS 
Dispute Settlement Regime: Lessons from Recent Decisions’ (2016) 15 Chinese Journal of International Law 403, 409-415. 
10 Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v France) [1974] ICJ Reports 457, para 30.  
11 Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) [1963] ICJ Reports 15, 
33-34. 
12 C Schreuer, ‘What is a Legal Dispute?’, in I Buffard, J Crawford, A Pellet, and S Wittich (eds), International Law 
between Universalism and Fragmentation: Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner (Brill 2008) 960. 
13 Mavromattis Palestine Concessions (Greece v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) PCIJ Reports Series A, No 2, 
11.  
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definition of a dispute has been followed in the context of UNCLOS dispute 
settlement for the purposes of interpreting and applying the compromissory 
clause in Article 286 and related provisions.14  Yet, as will be seen below, this 
simple definition is not always easy to apply in practice. 
 
It is generally accepted that the existence of a dispute is a question for 
objective determination15, meaning that it is not enough for one of the parties 
to assert that there is a dispute. In other words, there must be positive 
evidence of conflicting views or arguments.16 The burden of proof rests with 
the applicant to demonstrate that a dispute does in fact exist, in line with the 
general rule that it is up to the party advancing a particular claim to prove 
it.17  Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the threshold of establishing a 
dispute is a low one18 and courts and tribunals should be flexible in the 
manner in which they treat this issue.19 Not least, it has been pointed out that 
setting a high threshold has the potential to ‘undermine judicial economy and 
the sound administration of justice’ given that the applicant may simply be 
able to resubmit the claims at a later date when the dispute has further 
crystallized.20 At the same time, the existence of a dispute cannot be taken for 
granted.  
 
It is clear that as a preliminary matter, the applicant in UNCLOS 
litigation must first of all ‘proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views’ 
regarding the settlement of a dispute prior to the commencement of 
litigation.21  This requirement suggests that some form of notification of a 
dispute is necessary for the purposes of UNCLOS.  However, questions have 
arisen in relation to who is able to initiate such exchanges for the purposes of 
establishing the existence of a dispute at the international level. In the M/V 
Norstar Case, Italy received communications from a private Panamanian 
lawyer, beginning in August 2001, concerning the arrest of the Panamanian-
flagged vessel.  For its part, Italy argued that it had no way of knowing that 
this lawyer was acting on behalf of the Panamanian government and 
therefore these letters did not provide evidence of a dispute between the two 
states.  In this respect, the Tribunal held that in principle ‘it is for each State to 
determine the persons, including private persons, who represent the State or 
are authorized to act on its behalf in its relations with other States’22, but it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See eg Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases  (Australia and New Zealand v Japan) (Provisional Measures) [1999] ITLOS Reports 
293, para 44; M/V Norstar Case (Panama v Italy) (Preliminary Objections) ITLOS Judgment, 4 November 2016, para 85. 
15 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Reports 65, 74; see 
also South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) (Preliminary Objections) [1962] ICJ Reports 
319, 328; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v Canada) [1998] ICJ Reports 432, paras 30-31. 
16 Case concerning the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v Russian Federation) Preliminary Objections [2011] ICJ Reports 70, para 30. 
17 See eg Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Uruguay v Argentina) [2010] ICJ Reports 14, para 162 
referring to the principle of onus probandi incumbit actori. 
18 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall 
Islands v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Judgment, 5 October 2016, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Crawford, para 3. See also Schreuer (n12) 962. 
19 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (n18) 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Crawford, paras 3, 12. See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna.   
20 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Yusuf, para 24. 
21 UNCLOS, Article 283. See the discussion of this requirement by Bankes in his contribution to this special edition. 
22 M/V Norstar Case (n14) para 93. 
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went on to clarify that ‘for communications sent by a lawyer in private 
practice on behalf of a State to be opposable to another State, the latter needs 
to be duly informed of the authority conferred on the lawyer to represent the 
former State.’23 It continued, ‘the mere reference in a letter by a private person 
to the authorization given to that person by the State may not be sufficient.’24 
It followed from the facts of the case that it was only from the time when 
Panama sent a note verbale to Italy in August 2004 confirming that Mr 
Carreyó was acting as its agent that Italy could be aware of the dispute 
between the two states.25  This clarification concerning the nature in which a 
dispute under UNCLOS can be said to arise may prove to be important in 
future, given that several commentators have observed the increasing 
tendency for private law firms to act in UNCLOS dispute settlement 
proceedings.26 
 
Given that the existence of a dispute cannot be deduced from the 
perspective of one party to the proceedings, important questions have also 
arisen concerning the significance to be ascribed to the actions of the 
respondent in determining whether a dispute exists. It is generally accepted 
that the respondent does not need to expressly acknowledge the existence of a 
dispute, but rather that this fact can be implied from its outright rejection of 
claims27 or from other conduct.28   Moreover, it has also been held that the 
respondent cannot deny the existence of a dispute by simply refusing to 
acknowledge the claims of another state.29 In this respect, the ICJ noted in the 
Case concerning the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination that ‘the existence of a dispute may be 
inferred from the failure of a State to respond to a claim in circumstances 
where a response is called for.’30 This decision was followed by the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the M/V Norstar Case, 
in which it held that Italy could not rely upon its silence to cast doubt on the 
existence of a dispute with Panama.31 This is also in line with the case law 
under Article 283, recognizing that ‘a State Party is not obliged to continue 
with an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching 
an agreement have been exhausted.’32 Nevertheless, there may be 
circumstances in which the lack of a response can count as evidence that a 
dispute does not exist, for example where the initial communication was not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid, para 94. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, para 96. 
26 See eg D Anderson, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes under UNCLOS’, in J Barrett and R Barnes (eds), Law of the 
Sea: UNCLOS as a Living Treaty (BIICL 2016) 414; MS Karim, ‘Litigating Law of the Sea Disputes using the UNCLOS 
Dispute Settlement System’, in N Klein (ed), Litigating International Law Disputes: Weighing the Options (CUP 2014) 
260. 
27 See eg East Timor Case (n5) para 22. 
28 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (n18) para 
40.  
29 See eg Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 
June 1947 (Advisory Opinion) [1988] ICJ Reports 28, para 38. 
30 Case concerning the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(n16) para 30. 
31 M/V Norstar Case (n14) para 101. 
32 Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures) [2001] ITLOS Reports 89, para 60. 
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sufficiently specific in nature that it did not indicate the existence of a legal 
dispute.33  
 
Even if there is some evidence of a legal or factual dispute, it may also 
be necessary for the court or tribunal to determine the scope of the dispute 
before it. In principle, a dispute must already exist at the time at which the 
application is made to the court or tribunal34 and it follows that ‘although 
statements made or claims advanced in or even subsequently to the 
Application may be relevant for various purposes – notably in clarifying the 
scope of the dispute submitted - they cannot create a dispute de novo, one 
that does not already exist.’35  As a result, there must be at least an 
‘incipient’36 or ‘nascent’37 dispute prior to the application being made in order 
to meet this threshold criterion. This will depend upon the precise facts of the 
case. 
 
This issue arose obliquely in the Chagos MPA Arbitration where 
Mauritius had asked the Tribunal in its third submission to order the United 
Kingdom to refrain from taking steps that might prevent Mauritius from 
making a full submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS) in relation to the Chagos archipelago. However, this submission 
was only raised in the course of the arbitral proceedings. The United 
Kingdom objected that the submission was inadmissible because there was no 
dispute between the parties at the time when the application was made.  The 
Tribunal considered the history of the issue, which led it to agree with the 
United Kingdom that there was no dispute between the two parties in this 
respect.38  In its view, the record of meetings between the two countries 
leading up to the litigation demonstrated a willingness to cooperate on 
making a submission to the CLCS. Nor was this conclusion undermined by 
the arguments advanced by the United Kingdom in the course of oral 
proceedings, which the Tribunal said had to be understood as a response to 
the new claims being made by Mauritius.39  
 
The need to determine the scope of the dispute that is before a court or 
tribunal also arises when an applicant wishes to amend its claims in the 
process of litigation. At the outset, the relevant rules of procedure require the 
applicant to expressly state the legal basis of its claims. Thus, Article 24 of 
Annex VI of the Convention provides that a written application to ITLOS 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (n18) para 
49: ‘a statement can give rise to a dispute only if it refers to the subject-matter of a claim with sufficient clarity to 
enable the State against which that claim is made to identify that there is, or may be, a dispute with regard to that 
subject-matter.’ 
34 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Colombia) (Preliminary 
Objections), ICJ Judgment, 17 March 2016, para 52; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (n16) para 30. 
35 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (n18) para 
54. 
36 Ibid, Dissenting opinion of Judge Crawford, para 26. 
37 Ibid, Dissenting opinion of Judge Sebutinde, para 15. 
38 Chagos MPA Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom) (Jurisdiction and Merits) Annex VII Tribunal Award, 18 
March 2015, para 349. 
39 Ibid, para 348. 
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must indicate ‘the subject matter of the dispute.’ This provision is 
supplemented by Article 54(2) of the ITLOS Rules of Procedure, which 
provides that ‘the application shall specify as far as possible the legal grounds 
upon which the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is said to be based; it shall also 
specify the precise nature of the claim, together with a succinct statement of 
facts and grounds on which the claim is based.’ Identical language is found in 
the Rules of the ICJ.40  Although using slightly different language, a similar 
effect is achieved by Article 1 of Annex VII, which provides that a notification 
of arbitration ‘shall be accompanied by a statement of claim and the grounds 
on which it is based.’ The rationale behind these various rules of procedure is 
to ensure that the respondent has the opportunity to know the contours of the 
case against it at the outset and implementation of these rules has been 
emphasized as ‘essential from the point of view of legal security and the good 
administration of justice.’41 
 
Of course, a party is able to modify their pleadings as the case 
proceeds. However, the ICJ has confirmed that there are limits to this ability: 
‘the liberty accorded to the parties to amend their submissions up to the end 
of the oral proceedings must be construed reasonably … [but], it is clear that 
the Court cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought before it by 
application to be transformed by amendments in the submissions into another 
dispute which is different in character.’42  In practice, this requirement 
translates into a test as to whether any new or amended claims were implicit 
in the original claims43, which in turn begs the question of what the scope of 
the original dispute was. Similar principles apply to UNCLOS dispute 
settlement.44  Thus, in the M/V Louisa Case, Spain was not allowed to 
introduce claims relating to Article 300 during the course of the proceedings 
because it had the effect of ‘generat[ing] a new claim in comparison to the 
claims presented in the Application.’45 This case thus demonstrates the 
willingness of courts and tribunals to police these rules in order to ensure that 
dispute settlement procedures are not abused.  
 
It is worth noting that such requirements are not only aimed at 
protecting the rights of the respondent, but they have a broader objective of 
ensuring that the potential interests of third parties are also respected.46 This 
latter consideration is particularly pertinent in the context of a widely 
accepted multilateral treaty, such as UNCLOS. Moreover, it implies a 
significant limitation on the role of a court or tribunal because it means that 
the court or tribunal may not be able to hear a claim, even if the two parties 
agree thereto.47 As noted by the ICJ in this connection, ‘[t]here may … be an 
incompatibility between the desires of an applicant, or, indeed of both of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 ICJ Rules of Procedure, Article 38(1). 
41 M/V Louisa Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Spain) [2013] ITLOS Reports 4, para 148. 
42 Société Commerciale de Belgique Case [1939] PCIJ Reports, Series A/B, 160. 
43 See eg Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia) (Preliminary Objections) [1992] ICJ Reports 240, para 65; 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea [2007] ICJ Reports 659, para 108. 
44 M/V Louisa Case (n41) para 147. 
45 Ibid, para 142. 
46 Société Commerciale de Belgique Case (n42) 173. 
47 Northern Cameroons Case (n11) 29.  
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parties to a case, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the duty of the 
Court to maintain its judicial character. The Court itself, and not the parties, 
must be the guardian of the Court’s judicial integrity…’ 
 
 
3. The limits of subject-matter jurisdiction  
 
Given the limited scope of the compromissory clause in UNCLOS, it is not 
sufficient that there is merely a legal or factual dispute between the parties - 
there must also be a dispute within the agreed limits of jurisdiction. For 
present purposes, this means that there has to be a ‘dispute concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention.’48 The generality of many 
UNCLOS provisions means that applicants could potentially try to fit all 
manner of issues within the framework of the Convention and it is thus up to 
courts and tribunals to determine whether claims really implicate rights and 
obligations under UNCLOS at all. Such questions relating to subject-matter 
jurisdiction are questions of law for the determination of the court or tribunal 
in pursuit of its compétence de la compétence.49 Thus, it is not sufficient for a 
court or tribunal to ‘limit itself to noting that one of the Parties maintains that 
the [treaty] applies, while the other denies it.’50 Rather, it is for the court or 
tribunal to ascertain for itself that the acts complained of are capable of being 
addressed by the treaty provisions that have been invoked.  This has been 
termed by one eminent judge as a question of ‘the application of a treaty.’51 
 
 The M/V Louisa Case provides a leading example of the scope of 
UNCLOS dispute settlement being tested in this manner. This was a case 
concerning the detention of the M/V Louisa and its crew on charges of 
unlawfully collecting underwater cultural artifacts within Spanish waters, 
whilst purportedly conducting seafloor surveys intended to locate oil and gas 
deposits in the territorial sea and internal waters of Spain.  The arrest took 
place when the vessel was voluntarily docked at the port of El Puerto de 
Santa Maria in Spain. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as the flag state, 
alleged that the actions of Spain constituted a violation of various provisions 
of UNCLOS, namely Articles 73, 87, 226, 227 and 303. Even though Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines had invoked certain provisions of the 
Convention, Spain objected that this was not really an UNCLOS dispute at all. 
In addressing this argument, the ITLOS confirmed that it was necessary to 
‘establish a link between the facts advanced by Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines and the provisions of the Convention referred to by it and show 
that such provisions can sustain the claim or claims submitted by Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines.’52  In the case at hand, the Tribunal concluded 
that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had not satisfied this threshold 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 UNCLOS, Articles 286 and 288(1). 
49 UNCLOS, Article 288(4). 
50 Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v France) (Provisional Measures), ICJ Order, 7 December 
2016, para 47.  
51 See Oil Platforms Case (Iran v United States of America) (Preliminary Objections) [1996] ICJ Reports 803, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Higgins, paras 4-5. 
52 M/V Louisa Case (n41) para 99.   
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requirement because the various provisions invoked by it, and its 
interpretations thereof, could not ‘serve as a basis for the claims submitted.’53 
In other words, there may have been a dispute between Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines and Spain, but it did not implicate any of the provisions of 
UNCLOS.54 It is worth noting that the Tribunal reached this conclusion 
despite the fact that it had previously found that it had prima facie 
jurisdiction for the purposes of ordering provisional measures.55 As explained 
by Judge Paik in his Separate Opinion: 
 
‘The methodology and the standard of appreciation to be applied for a 
definitive finding of jurisdiction cannot be identical with those for a 
prima facie finding. While “plausible connection” may be enough for 
prima facie jurisdiction, it falls short for the present case, in which a 
definitive finding on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction must be made. It 
should surprise no one that different standards for a jurisdictional link 
can lead to different conclusions.’56 
  
It is important to point out that the finding of the Tribunal in this case 
is expressed in terms of jurisdiction.57  The character of this finding largely 
derives from the fact that the Tribunal was considering the potential 
applicability of the Convention to the evidence that have been pleaded by 
Saint Vincent, but it did not make any decision relating to the veracity of that 
evidence.  In other words, it did not enter into the merits of whether there had 
been a violation of the relevant provisions.  Nevertheless, this decision does 
rest upon a definitive finding relating to the interpretation of the Convention 
and so it is not completely separate from the merits of the case. 
 
It is also possible for a respondent to raise the lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction as a preliminary objection.58 The making of a preliminary 
objection has the effect of suspending proceedings on the merits until a 
decision is rendered on the objections.59 This is an important procedural right 
for the respondent in order to avoid lengthy and costly proceedings in a case 
that ultimately has no jurisdictional basis. In other words, it is an important 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid, paras 105, 109, 113, 117, 119. 
54 As noted by Churchill, ‘if St. Vincent did have a case, it was not a law of the sea case, but a human rights case’; RR 
Churchill, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2013’ (2015) 30 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 1, 10. 
55 M/V Louisa Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Spain) (Provisional Measures) [2008-2010] ITLOS Reports 58, 
para 69. The Order also made clear that it did not prejudge the question of jurisdiction on the merits; ibid, para 46 
56 Ibid, Separate Opinion of Judge Paik, para 18. 
57 Ibid, para 160(1). 
58 It should be noted that an additional procedure for challenging the validity of claims related to the exercise of 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction in the EEZ applies by virtue of Article 294, which introduces an expedited procedure 
to request claims to be struck out where they constitute ‘an abuse of legal process’ or they are ‘prima facie 
unfounded.’ This provision was introduced at the bequest of coastal states who were concerned about vexatious 
litigation. See S Rosenne and LB Sohn (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 – A Commentary, 
Volume V (Martinus Nijhoff 1989) 76-78. The threshold for rejecting a case under this provision would appear to be a 
high one, however. In the South China Sea Arbitration, the Tribunal refused to invoke Article 294 using its proprio 
motu powers, saying that ‘In light of the serious consequences of a finding of abuse of process or prima facie 
unfoundedness, the Tribunal considers that the procedure is appropriate in only the most blatant cases of abuse or 
harassment’ South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v People’s Republic of China) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 
Annex VII Arbitration Award, 29 October 2015, para 128. 
59 Ibid. 
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mechanism for policing the limits of subject-matter jurisdiction.  At the same 
time, it raises complex issues because a decision on the correct interpretation 
to be given to the Convention and its potential applicability to the case must 
be made before all the evidence and arguments have been advanced by the 
parties.  A question arises in this context of whether a court or tribunal should 
give a definitive answer regarding subject-matter jurisdiction at this stage60, 
or whether it should simply ask whether the claims ‘reasonably relate to … 
the legal standards of the treaty in point.’61  
 
The M/V Norstar Case provides an example where the respondent 
made a preliminary objection that the claims advanced by the applicant fell 
outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The case had been 
initiated by Panama, as the flag state of the M/V Norstar, which claimed in its 
Application that the arrest of the tanker by Italy had violated Articles 33, 73, 
87, 111, 226 and 300 of the Convention. Italy argued that these provisions 
were simply not applicable to the facts of the case.  Panama subsequently 
withdrew its claims in relation to Articles 73 and 226 in the course of the oral 
proceedings62, leaving the Tribunal to determine the applicability of the 
remaining provisions to the facts of the case. On the basis of the evidence 
before it, the Tribunal held that Articles 33 and 58 had no bearing on the facts 
because they were applicable to maritime zones that were not relied upon by 
Italy in the exercise of its powers.63 It therefore had no jurisdiction over these 
claims.  In contrast, the Tribunal accepted that ‘article 87 is relevant to the … 
case’64 According to the Tribunal, the actions complained of ‘may be viewed 
as an infringement of the rights of Panama under article 87.’65 Moreover, to 
the extent that Panama claimed that Italy had failed to fulfill its obligations 
under article 87 in good faith, article 300 was also ‘relevant.’66  These matters 
will therefore proceed to the merits.   
 
One criticism of the judgment on this point is that the standard of 
appreciation that is applied by the Tribunal is not very clear.67 Indeed, Judge 
ad hoc Treves goes further in his dissenting opinion by suggesting that the 
test applied by the Tribunal was more akin to the test applicable to prima 
facie jurisdiction, rather than a test that should be applied in an authoritative 
finding on jurisdiction. He thus calls for ‘a more severe test’ in this context.68 
Judges Wolfrum and Attard were also concerned that the Tribunal did not 
apply a sufficiently robust threshold for ascertaining that Article 87 was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See Oil Platforms Case (n51) Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins. 
61 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (SBT Award), Annex VII Arbitration Award, 4 
August 2000, para 48. It continued, ‘in the instant case, it is for this Tribunal to decide whether the “real dispute” 
between the Parties does or does not reasonably (and not just remotely) relate to the obligations set forth in the 
treaties whose breach is alleged.’ 
62 See M/V Norstar Case (n14)) para 108. 
63 Ibid, paras 114 and 116. 
64 Ibid, para 122. 
65 Ibid, para 122. 
66 Ibid, para 132. 
67 Ibid, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Wolfrum and Attard, para 5.  
68 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Treves, para 13. He continues, ‘such a test should not have been limited 
to the arguments of the parties.  In matters of jurisdiction, the Tribunal must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction.’  
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applicable to the facts as pleaded.69 Underpinning these opinions is the idea 
that a court or tribunal must not neglect its important function of screening 
out inappropriate claims. However, Judges Wolfrum and Attard also appear 
to acknowledge that the facts available to the Tribunal in the preliminary 
ojections proceedings may not have been sufficient to make a definitive 
decision at this point in time.70 This observation underlines the complexities 
of dealing with preliminary objections to subject-matter jurisdiction.  
 
One way to deal with this situation would be to utlise the power 
contained in the relevant rules of procedure to refuse to give judgment on a 
preliminary objection by declaring that ‘the objection does not possess, in the 
circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character.’71 72 It must be 
acknowledged that there is a risk to utilizing this power because it prolongs 
the proceedings and it adds to the costs of litigation. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that this power should be used sparingly. For example, Judge 
Bennouna argued in the Case concerning the Duty to Negotiate Access to the 
Pacific Ocean that ‘it is only in exceptional circumstances that the Court may 
find that an objection does not possess an exclusive preliminary character, 
where it does not have all the elements required to make a decision, or where 
such a decision would prejudge the dispute, or some aspects thereof, on the 
merits.’73   This point of view is supported by the drafting history of the 
relevant article of the ICJ Rules of Procedure, which were later used as the 
basis for the ITLOS Rules of Procedure. It is generally accepted that the rule 
was drafted in such a way as to ‘limit the exercise of [the power to examine a 
preliminary objection in the merits phase] by laying down the conditions 
more strictly.’74 The ICJ has even gone as far as saying that ‘in principle, a 
party raising preliminary objections is entitled to have these objections 
answered at the preliminary stage of the proceedings unless the Court does 
not have before it all facts necessary to decide the questions raised or if 
answering the preliminary objections would determine the dispute, or some 
elements thereof, on the merits.’75 Yet, any such principle may be easily 
outweighed in relation to an objection to the subject-matter jurisdiction of a 
court or tribunal. As once explained by Judge Cançado Trindade, ‘a 
preliminary objection to jurisdiction ratione materiae is more likely to appear 
related to the merits of a case than an objection to jurisdiction ratione 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See also Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Wolfrum and Attard, para 6: ‘In our view the standard of appreciation 
applied by the Judgment does not even meet the prima facie standard of appreciation in provisional measures 
proceedings.’ 
70 Ibid, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Wolfrum and Attard, paras 3 and 43. See also the Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge ad hoc Treves, para 18. 
71 ITLOS Rules of Procedure, Article 97(6); ICJ Rules of Procedure, Article 79(7). Similar provisions are sometimes 
found in the rules of procedure adopted for Annex VII arbitral tribunals; see e.g. Rules of Procedure in the South 
China Sea Arbitration, Article 20(3); Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, Rules of Procedure, Article 20(3). 
72 Judges Wolfrum and Attard hint that they may have preferred this solution; see Joint Separate Opinion, para 3. 
73 Case concerning the Duty to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v Chile) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ 
Judgment, 24 September 2015, Separate Opinion of Judge Bennouna. 
74 Lockerbie Case (Libya v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Reports 9, para 49. See also Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Reports 1, para 
41: ‘This approach tends to discourage the unnecessary prolongation of proceedings at the jurisdictional phase.’ 
75 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) (Preliminary Objections) [2007] ICJ Reports 832, para 51. See 
also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (n74) para 41. Previously, such decisions had been 
made as a matter of discretion taking into account ‘the good administration of justice’; see Panevezys-Saldutiskis 
Railway Case (Estonia v Lithuania) (Preliminary Objections) [1939] PCIJ Reports Series A/B, No 29, 53, 56. 
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personae or ratione temporis.’76 In light of this observation, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that many UNCLOS tribunals have in practice classified 
decisions on whether or not a claim falls to be decided under the Convention 
as not having an exclusively preliminary character, thus avoiding having to 
take a position in the preliminary proceedings.77   
 
 
4. Subject-matter Jurisdiction and Admissibility of Claims in Mixed 
Disputes  
 
Rarely do law of the sea disputes raise questions about the interpretation and 
application of UNCLOS alone.  The broad and general nature of the 
obligations found in UNCLOS mean that there is often what has been called 
‘a parallelism of treaties’78, where a controversy between two states in fact 
touches upon questions concerning the interpretation and application of more 
than one treaty. Similarly, a dispute concerning the interpretation and 
application of UNCLOS may also simultaneously raise issues under the rules 
of customary international law. What are the consequences of this situation 
for the exercise of jurisdiction by a court or tribunal acting under Part XV of 
UNCLOS?  
 
It has been made clear by several courts or tribunals that the fact that 
the dispute raises issues under other rules of international law, either treaty 
or custom, would not prevent them in principle from exercising jurisdiction in 
relation to an UNCLOS dispute.  For example, the Tribunal in the MOX Plant 
Arbitration held that the fact that other treaties were relevant to some of the 
issues raised by the claims did not ‘alter the character of the dispute as one 
essentially involving the interpretation and application of [UNCLOS].’79  In 
this case, the Arbitral Tribunal emphasized the distinct identity of obligations 
under the parallel treaties, noting that that ‘even if the OSPAR Convention, 
the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty contain rights or obligations similar to 
or identical with the rights or obligations set out in [UNCLOS], the rights and 
obligations under those agreements have a separate existence from those 
under [UNCLOS].’80  Thus, the Tribunal emphasized the severability of the 
different aspects of the dispute, meaning it can deal with those parts of the 
dispute that do fall within its jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
 
 A similar issue arose in the South China Sea Arbitration, where China 
argued in its position paper, which was treated as a plea on jurisdiction by the 
Tribunal, that ‘the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is territorial 
sovereignty over several maritime features in the South China Sea, which is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Case concerning the Duty to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (n73) Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, 
para 6. 
77 See eg Chagos MPA Arbitration, Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal Procedural Order No 2, 15 January 2013; Duzgit 
Integrity Arbitration (Malta v Sao Tome and Principe) Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal Award, 24 August 2015, para 19. See 
also South China Sea Arbitration (n58) para 413(H). 
78 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration (n61) para 52. 
79 MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal Order No 3, 24 June 2003, para 18. 
80 Ibid, para 50. 
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beyond the scope of the Convention and does not concern the interpretation 
and application of the Convention.’81 In its analysis, the Tribunal agreed that 
there was a dispute over sovereignty, but, on the basis of the facts, it went on 
to hold that the Philippines had identified a number of separate questions 
concerning the interpretation and application of UNCLOS. When it came to 
characterizing these claims, the Tribunal rejected the view that sovereignty 
claims were implicit in the submissions of the Philippines.82 It expressly noted 
that it was ‘fully conscious of the limits on the claims submitted to it and … 
intends to ensure that its decision neither advances nor detracts from either 
Party’s claims to land sovereignty in the South China Sea.’83  
 
On the basis of this jurisprudence, one author concludes that ‘if an 
applicant state can make out a plausible case that a dispute involves the 
interpretation and application of [UNCLOS], the court or tribunal concerned 
will have jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the dispute may also 
relate to the interpretation and application of another treaty.’84 There is a large 
degree of truth in this statement. Yet, more recent case law suggests that  
there may be more complex situations. In particular, the result may differ if a 
decision on a claim under UNCLOS requires the prior determination of a 
claim under another independent rule of international law.85   
 
In principle, courts or tribunals are able to apply other sources of law 
that may be necessary to determine disputes under the Convention.86 To this 
end, Article 293 of UNCLOS expressly provides that ‘a court or tribunal 
having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other 
rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention.’ Moreover, 
in the Chagos MPA Arbitration, the Tribunal explicitly held that ‘the 
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal pursuant to Article 288(1) extends to making 
such … ancillary determinations of law as are necessary to resolve the dispute 
presented to it.’87  Yet, the Tribunal went on to suggest that there may be a 
significant caveat to this assertion.  In this case, the Tribunal was faced with 
claims concerning certain actions taken by the United Kingdom in relation to 
the Chagos archipelago, a group of islands in the Indian Ocean over which 
both the United Kingdom and Mauritius claim sovereignty. In its Application, 
Mauritius asserted that the United Kingdom had violated UNCLOS by 
declaring a marine protected area in the waters surrounding the Chagos 
archipelago when it was not the coastal state. This case is therefore an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 South China Sea Arbitration (n58) para 133. 
82 In determining the nature of the claim, the Tribunal not only drew upon the formal arguments of the parties, but 
also on ‘diplomatic exchanges, public statements, and other pertinent evidence.’ The Tribunal also noted the 
importance of distinguishing between ‘the dispute itself and the arguments used by the parties to sustain their 
respective submissions on the dispute.’ 
83 South China Sea Arbitration (n58) para 153. 
84 Churchill (n8) 401. 
85 What has been called elsewhere, an ‘indispensible issue’; see P Tzeng, ‘The Doctrine of Indispensible Issues: 
Mauritius v United Kingdom, Philippines v China, Ukraine v Russia, and Beyond’, EJIL Talk!, 14 October 2016, 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-doctrine-of-indispensable-issues-mauritius-v-united-kingdom-philippines-v-china-
ukraine-v-russia-and-beyond/> accessed 15 November 2016. 
86 See eg J Harrison, ‘Judicial Law-Making and the Developing Order of the Oceans’ (2007) 22 International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 283, 299; M Wood, 'The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and General International 
Law' (2007) 22 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 351. 
87 Chagos MPA Arbitration (n38) para 220.  
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example of what has been termed in some of the literature as a ‘mixed 
dispute.’ 88    
 
On the face of it, the relevant claims raised by Mauritius did involve 
‘the interpretation and application’ of UNCLOS. More precisely, the Tribunal 
was being asked, inter alia, to interpret and apply the phrase ‘coastal state’ in 
Articles 2, 55, 56 and 76.  At the same time, these claims were also obviously 
part of a broader dispute between the parties.89 It was on this basis that the 
UK objected to jurisdiction, arguing that the Mauritian claims were ‘an 
artificial re-characterisation of the long-standing sovereignty dispute’ in a 
manner to attempt to bring it within the scope of UNCLOS.90  The Arbitral 
Tribunal was thus required to deal with the proper characterization of the 
dispute.  
 
The Tribunal did not deny that there were different strands to the 
dispute.91  In determining this objection to jurisdiction, the Tribunal noted 
that it was necessary to ‘[evaluate] where the relative weight of the dispute 
lies’92 and determine whether the dispute is fundamentally one that raises 
substantial issues under the Convention or whether the Convention is merely 
‘incidental’ to the sovereignty dispute.93 According to the Tribunal, this must 
be determined on an objective basis. 94 Previous jurisprudence of the ICJ in 
the Nuclear Tests Case and the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case was invoked by the 
Tribunal as a means for looking beyond the pleadings in order to determine 
the real character of the dispute.95 In particular, the Tribunal stressed that it 
was ‘obliged to consider the context of the submission and the manner in 
which it has been presented in order to establish the dispute actually 
separating the Parties.’96 
 
On the facts of the case, the majority of the Tribunal held that the 
dispute was ‘properly characterized as relating to land sovereignty over the 
Chagos Archipelago’ and ‘the parties’ differing views on the “coastal State” 
for the purposes of the Convention are simply one aspect of this larger 
dispute.’97  In reaching this conclusion, it noted that the arguments under 
UNCLOS were relatively recent in origin compared to the broader 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 The term ‘mixed dispute’ is used, for example, by M Nordquist et al (eds), The United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982 – A Commentary, Volume V (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989) 117. See also I Buga, ‘Territorial 
Sovereignty Issues in Maritime Disputes: A Jurisdictional Dilemma for Law of the Sea Tribunals’ (2012) 27 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 59-95. 
89 As explained by Karim, there was no other forum to settle the wider dispute as the parties had made their 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ subject to a reservation for disputes with another member of the 
Commonwealth; see Karim (n26) 274. 
90 Chagos MPA Arbitration (n38) para 207. 
91 See ibid, paras 209-211. 
92 Ibid, para 211. See also para 229. 
93 Ibid, para 220: ‘where the “real issue in the case” and the “object of the claim” do not relate to the interpretation or 
application of the Convention, however, an incidental connection between the dispute and some matter regulated by 
the Convention is insufficient to bring the dispute, as a whole, within the ambit of Article 288(1).’ 
94 Ibid, para 208. 
95 Ibid, para 208. 
96 Ibid, para 229. 
97 Ibid, para 212. The Tribunal used similar reasoning to dismiss related claims about the status of the Mauritius as a 
coastal state; ibid, para 229. 
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sovereignty issues.98 The Tribunal also took particular account of the 
consequences of deciding the claim.99 In this context, the Tribunal was keen to 
stress the ‘inherent sensitivity of States to questions of territorial 
sovereignty.’100   Thus, the majority concluded that there was only an 
‘incidental connection’ between the real dispute and the matters regulated by 
UNCLOS and this nexus was insufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction 
over the claims.101  
 
It would appear that this balancing test confers a degree of discretion 
on the court or tribunal in order to decide whether the nexus between the 
claims and the Convention is sufficiently strict. For example, Talmon argues 
that ‘any evaluation of where the “relative weight” of a dispute lies is an 
inherently subjective exercise.’102 This is further supported by the manner in 
which the Tribunal frames the question to be answered:103 
 
‘Is the Parties’ dispute primarily a matter of the interpretation and 
application of the term “coastal State”, with the issue of sovereignty 
forming one aspect of a larger question? Or does the Parties’ dispute 
primarily concern sovereignty, with the United Kingdom’s actions as a 
“coastal State” merely representing a manifestation of that dispute?’ 
 
If one accepts this understanding of the test, it would appear that 
different courts and tribunals may take divergent views on this issue. Indeed, 
even in this case, the reasoning of the Tribunal on this point was subject to a 
joint dissenting opinion by Wolfrum and Kateka, who argued that the 
Tribunal had not paid sufficient attention to the careful wording of the first 
and second submissions of Mauritius.104 For these two arbitrators, the dispute 
was properly characterized as relating to the interpretation and application of 
UNCLOS and thus the Tribunal had denied Mauritius the right to bring 
claims that legitimately fell within the scope of UNCLOS.   
 
The discretionary element of the test would appear to find further 
support in the fact that even the majority accepted that some mixed disputes 
may sometimes be submitted to UNCLOS dispute settlement. In a significant 
obiter dictum, the Tribunal noted that they were not willing to ‘categorically 
exclude that in some instances a minor issue of territorial sovereignty could 
indeed be ancillary to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of the Convention.’105 Any distinction between major and minor issues of 
territorial sovereignty is not one that can be the subject of a strict test, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Ibid, para 211. 
99 Ibid, para 211. 
100 Ibid, para 216. 
101 Ibid, para 220. 
102 S Talmon, ‘The Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration: A Case Study of the Creeping Expansion of the 
Jurisdiction of UNCLOS Part XV Courts and Tribunals’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 927, 933-
934. 
103 Chagos MPA Arbitration (n38) para 211. 
104 See ibid, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfrum and Kateka, para 17. See also paras 19, 45 and 47. 
105 Ibid, para 221. 
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must be determined by a Tribunal exercising a degree of discretion in its 
assessment of the evidence before it.  
 
This latter consideration also suggests that the Tribunal is  - contrary to 
what it says in the dispositif106 – in fact concerned with the admissibility of 
the claims, rather than a strict question of jurisdiction.  All of its reasons 
pertain to the appropriateness or propriety of dealing with the claims, which 
is usually understood as a question of admissibility.107  Indeed, it may also be 
easier to justify the scope for discretion in the context of admissibility108 than 
it is in relation to jurisdiction, which, after all, is concerned primarily with the 




There is no doubt that compulsory dispute settlement is a fundamental 
feature of UNCLOS.  The Convention is unlikely to have been concluded 
without some guarantee that questions concerning its implementation would 
be able to be resolved by an independent adjudicator.  Yet, Part XV of the 
Convention does not necessarily provide a panacea for addressing all 
maritime problems. By its very nature, UNCLOS established a system of 
limited subject-matter jurisdiction and it follows that there are a number of 
thresholds that must be met before claims can be settled using the UNCLOS 
procedures.  This paper has considered the manner in which courts and 
tribunal acting under Part XV of UNCLOS have dealt with questions 
concerning the precise scope of their subject-matter jurisdiction.  With this in 
mind, the paper addressed the main issues that have arisen in this context, 
explaining the key features of the jurisprudence and the factors that are taken 
into account by courts and tribunals in determining their jurisdiction.  
 
Whilst the legal basis for compulsory dispute settlement may lie in the 
consent of the parties, it is courts and tribunals that ultimately wield a 
significant amount of power to decide whether or not a particular dispute can 
proceed to a decision on the merits. Indeed, there would appear to be some 
flexibility inherent in deciding these threshold issues, exemplified by the 
manner in which courts and tribunals identify the existence of a dispute or 
the way in which they characterize claims of the parties for the purposes of 
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction.  
 
 The critical role of courts and tribunals in this context is perhaps 
demonstrated most powerfully by the Chagos MPA Arbitration, in which the 
Tribunal employed a preponderance test in order to decide whether to 
entertain the claims advanced by Mauritius. In this case, they determined that 
two key aspects of the submissions could not proceed to the merits, because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Ibid, para 547(A)(1). 
107 J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn: CUP 2012) 693. See also R Kolb, The 
International Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 2013) 201.  
108 S Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005, Volume II (4th edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2006) 532-533. 
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there was not a sufficient connection to UNCLOS. This approach introduces a 
significant degree of flexibility into determining the contours of which 
disputes may be submitted to UNCLOS dispute settlement and it leaves such 
questions to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the Award is 
explicitly drafted in order to leave the door ajar for ‘minor territorial disputes’ 
to be treated as an integral part of an UNCLOS dispute. The question of what 
is a minor territorial dispute will doubtless be subject to litigation in the 
future.109  Nor is it only mixed disputes raising related questions of territorial 
sovereignty that may present this problem; disputes under overlapping 
treaties may in some circumstances also raise questions about where the 
preponderance of the dispute lies.110  
 
How courts and tribunals use their inherent judicial powers to delimit 
the existence of a dispute or to determine which claims are suitable for 
settlement through the UNCLOS procedures reveals a lot about their 
perceptions of the function and importance of dispute settlement under the 
Convention. The fact that disagreements have arisen in many of these cases 
illustrates the divisive nature of this issue. Yet, the importance of these 
questions also cannot be understated. How courts and tribunals make such 
decisions will ultimately dictate the scope of subject-matter jurisdiction under 
UNCLOS111 with repercussions for all States Parties to the Convention, as 
well as the overall legitimacy of the UNCLOS dispute settlement system.112 
One consequence of this observation is that courts and tribunals cannot be 
guided solely by the arguments of the parties in a particular case, but they 
must also take into account the broader systemic concerns that could inform 
their decision.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 DA Colson and BJ Vohrer, ‘In re Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. United Kingdom) (2015) 109 
American Journal of International Law 845, 851. See also Tzeng (n85) noting that this issue is likely to arise in the 
arbitration pending between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. 
110 An example may be provided by the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration (n61). Although this arbitration was 
disposed on alternative grounds, the Tribunal did expressly say that ‘the Parties to this dispute … are the same 
Parties grappling with not two separate disputes but what is in fact a single dispute arising under both Conventions’; 
ibid, para 54. Following the approach in the Chagos MPA Arbitration, the Tribunal could have found that the claims 
under UNCLOS were inadmissible, if they considered that the dispute arose predominantly under the Convention 
on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, rather than under UNCLOS.   
111 Ibid. 
112 Making this point in a different context, see eg AD Sofaer, ‘The Philippine Law of the Sea Action against China: 
Relearning the Limits of International Adjudication’ (2016) 15 Chinese Journal of International Law 393, 400-401. 
